Abstract -
INTRODUCTION
A recently released draft of a study by the United Nation's Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that the earth's surface temperature will rise 2.5 to 10.4 degrees Fahrenheit between 1990 and 2100-an increase from its 1995 projection of a 1.8 to 8.3 degree rise. The report also says new evidence further shows that warming is caused primarily by pollution, not by changes in the sun or other natural atmospheric phenomena. Such findings generate increased interest in policies designed to reduce carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), the primary pollutant associated with global warming. Agreement on such policies, however, has been elusive due to remaining uncertainties in the science of climate change, uncertainty about the cost associated with decreasing CO 2 emissions, and controversy about the distribution of those costs. This paper focuses on the distributional effects.
If the U.S. should limit CO 2 emissions, an allowance trading policy may offer one method of achieving that goal in a cost-effective manner. Under such a program the U.S. government would limit the level of domestic CO 2 emissionsmeasured in carbon equivalents, and hereafter referred to as carbon emissions-and distribute rights to those emissions, called allowances. Firms could then determine the least costly way to meet the desired emission limit by buying and selling those allowances.
We examine the distributional effects of an allowance policy designed to achieve a 15 percent decrease in carbon emissions from a business-as-usual baseline. If the U.S. were to implement such a program, government officials would need to determine how the allowances would be distributed. That decision would affect how the ultimate cost of the policy would be distributed across U.S. households. This paper examines the distributional consequences of two alternative strategies for allocating allowances: the government gives allowances away and the government auctions them off. In either cases the government would capture at least some of the allowance value. If the government gave allowances away, it would capture some of their value through taxes collected on the increased profits that the allowances would generate. If the government auctioned allowances off, it would capture 100 percent of the allowance value (assuming a perfectly efficient auction) in the form of auction revenue. The ultimate distributional effects of both allocation alternatives, therefore, would depend-at least in parton the government's decision about how to use those additional federal receipts.
We assume that the government would use that additional revenue in one of three ways: to decrease corporate taxes, to decrease payroll taxes or to provide lumpsum rebates to households. Those alternative uses of revenue illustrate the wide range of distributional effects that might result from an allowance trading policy, as well as a trade-off between two potentially conflicting goals: efficiency and equity. Lump-sum rebates are featured in trading proposals being advocated in the U.S. (described below). Replacing employment taxes with environmental taxes has been of considerable interest in some European countries where both employment taxes and unemployment are relatively high.
Finally, we examine how international trading would alter the distributional effects of a given allowance allocation/revenue-recycling strategy. Understanding the distributional effects associated with alternative designs of a carbon trading policy is crucial because the magnitude of the wealth that would be redistributed as a result of the policy could substantially exceed the actual cost to the economy. 1 This paper expands upon previous work in several ways.
2 Like Casler and Rafiqui (1993) , and more recent research by Metcalf (1999) , we combine input-output industry data with household-level data, so that policy effects on prices of intermediate inputs in production are traced ultimately to consumer prices and households. Casler and Rafiqui examined the incidence of a fuel tax, while Metcalf examined a package of environmental taxes, which included a carbon tax. We build upon Metcalf's work in a variety of ways. We distribute the deadweight losses that the policy would cause due to the declines in carbon consumption and factor supplies. We also separate the distributional effects associated with government carbon consumption from private sector carbon consumption. Because Metcalf examined a tax, not an allowance trading policy, we also expand on his findings by contrasting the distributional effects of auctioning off allowances (analogous to a tax) with giving allowances away. Further, we look at the distributional implications of international trading of allowances. Finally, we highlight the problems in measuring distributional effects that are caused by poor data on households' consumption and income. Jorgenson et. al. (1998) examined the distributional effects of a carbon trading policy using a dynamic general-equilibrium model. Our analysis lacks the dynamic effects that Jorgenson et. al. accounted for; however, we do account for deadweight losses in factor markets as well as in the carbon market. We use detailed micro data on the annual expenditures and incomes of households to distribute policy effects, as opposed to simulated consumption levels for infinitely-lived households. In addition, we account for the recycling of revenue that the government would capture if it gave the allowances away. That has a significant impact on the distributional effects of a free-distribution strategy. Further, we examine the distributional effects of the case in which the government would auction off allowances and then distribute the revenue to households in a lump sum fashion. That is important because several proposals have been made to undertake such a policy (discussed below). Finally, Jorgenson et. al. did not consider the distributional implications of international allowance trading.
ALLOCATING EMISSION ALLOWANCES
The decision about how to allocate allowances is an important aspect of policy design. The federal government has distributed allowances for free in the environmental trading programs that it has implemented thus far, including ones to reduce the lead content of gasoline, phase out the use of ozone-depleting chemicals, and limit sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) emissions in order to reduce acid rain.
3 Freely distributing allowances can make the policy more acceptable to the regulated community because it allows them to capture a large share of the allowance rent; however, there can also be benefits from distributing the allowances through an auction. 4 The revenue that is raised from the auction can be used to cut existing taxes that cause distortions in the economy. For example, taxes on capital can discourage saving and investment. Likewise, taxes on labor can discourage individuals from working more and employers from using more labor. If the revenue raised by auctioning off emission allowances were used to reduce taxes on capital and labor, those adverse incentives could be reduced (Parry, 1997) .
Finally, some individuals argue that carbon allowances should be sold through an auction, with the revenue redistributed to make the trading policy more equitable. For example, the Corporation for Enterprise Development has proposed that the revenue from a carbon auction be put into a "Sky Trust."
5 The bulk of the trust fund would be issued as payments to U.S. citizens, with each citizen receiving the same payment. The concept behind this proposal is that all individuals own the "rights" to the sky, and each individual should receive an equal amount of the rent that is generated when those rights are auctioned off. In addition, researchers at Resources for the Future have also proposed that carbon allowances be auctioned off and that the revenue be re-3 Of the 8.69 million SO 2 allowances issued in 1995, 1.7 percent were auctioned off by the EPA (Ellerman et. al, 1997, p. 12) . The purpose of the auctions was to assure a supply of allowances for new utilities and, for early auctions, to provide a price signal for allowance prices in a nascent market. See Anderson and Lohof (1997) for an overview of trading programs in the U.S. 4 We assume that the government would distribute allowances on the basis of firms' past production (or emission) levels, as was done with allowances for sulphur dioxide emissions. If the government tied allowance allocations to current production decisions (output based allocations) then producers would tend to pass the allowance value onto consumers in the form of lower prices and the distributional effects would be different than those presented in this paper. For a theoretical discussion of output based allocations see Fischer (2000) .
For an empirical analysis of the effect of different allocations systems for a cap and trade program for the electricity sector see Burtraw et. al. (2001 A restriction on carbon emissions can be viewed as a restriction on the use of carbon-based fossil fuels, including petroleum, coal and natural gas. In this paper, we assume that the government would achieve a 15 percent carbon emission reduction by implementing an "upstream" trading program that requires producers and importers of fossil fuels to obtain an allowance for each ton of carbon that is emitted when their fuel is burned. For a discussion of the advantages of an upstream design, see Fischer, Kerr, and Toman (1998) . Figure 1 shows the partial equilibrium effects of a carbon restriction. Carbon is not a good that is bought and sold-however, the supply and demand for fossil fuels create an implicit market for carbon. As firms produce fossil fuels they simultaneously produce carbon. Likewise, when firms or households purchase fossil fuels they simultaneously purchase carbon. Here we assume that the policy reduces carbon to Q post-policy . The price corresponding to Q post-policy is P post-policy . As described below, we assume that in the long run the supply of capital and labor into the production of carbon is perfectly elastic; thus, the post-policy price of carbon is determined by the elasticity of demand. The difference between P post-policy and P initial is equal to the price of an allowance. The partial equilibrium effects of the policy can be broken down into two components: deadweight loss and income transfer effects.
The deadweight loss reflects the losses that occur because the prices of goods would be distorted in ways that do not reflect the non-environmental resources used in their production. It includes the cost of switching to less carbon-intensive technologies as well as the inconvenience costs associated with consuming less carbon-that is, less carbon-based fossil fuels.
The income transfer indicates the redistribution of income from households that 'pay' for the allowances to households that receive the value (rent) of the allowances. This income transfer is not a cost to the economy as a whole, but contributes to distributional effects because households' share of the allowance costs are likely to be different from their share of the allowance rent. Households "pay" for the allowances by paying higher prices for the goods that they consume. The need to require allowances becomes a part of the cost of selling fossil fuels, and producers pass that cost onto intermediate producers and, ultimately, to final consumers. Commodity prices increase based on the amount of carbon associated with their production and consumption (hereafter, referred to as "carbon content"). The impact of these higher prices on households (that is, households' share of the allowance costs) is determined by their purchasing patterns; it is independent of the government's decision whether to distribute allowances freely or through an auction. 7 The share of the allowance rent that different households receive, in contrast, is determined by that government decision (discussed below).
In addition to the partial equilibrium deadweight loss and income transfer effect, the policy would bring about an additional efficiency cost. By raising the price of consumer goods, the policy would lower the real returns to capital and labor. That in turn would reduce factor supplies, which are already distorted by preexisting taxes. That effect, called the tax interaction effect, creates an additional deadweight loss in the factor markets. The tax-interaction effect can be partially offset by government decisions about how to use the share of the allowance rent that it captures. Thus, the magnitude of the net increase in the deadweight loss in the factor markets that the carbon policy would generate would depend on the allowance allocation/revenue-recycling strategy that the government chose (discussed below).
The method that the government chose to distribute the allowances would determine the distribution of the allowance rent. If the government were to distribute the allowances freely, that rent would go to the firms that receive the allowances. 8 Here we assume that the government would capture 45 percent of the rent through taxes paid on the windfall profits that the rent represents. 9 The 55 percent of rent that would not be captured through taxes would be ultimately distributed among households that are shareholders of those companies. If the allowances were distributed through an auction, all of the rent would be received by the U.S. government in the form of auction revenue.
In both the free-distribution and the auction scenario, the ultimate magnitude and distribution of the policy costs across U.S. households would depend on how the government chose to recycle the revenue that it received. The magnitude of the policy-induced deadweight loss in the factor markets would be less if the government used the revenue to decrease pre-existing taxes than if it used the revenue to provide lump-sum transfers to households. In the former case, the cut in pre-existing taxes would partially offset the tax-interaction effect. This efficiency gain is called the revenue recycling effect. In the later case, the lump-sum payments would not stimulate any revenue recycling effect. Under the auction scenario, government decisions about revenue recycling would have a larger impact on the ultimate distributional effects of the policy because the government would capture all of the rent.
The ultimate incidence of the policy is the combined effect of the decrease in households' real income that would occur due to the price changes that would result from the policy (the allowance cost and the deadweight losses in the carbon market and factor markets) and the increase in households' real income that would occur due to the rent that is distributed through the allocation/revenuerecycling process.
Quantifying the Aggregate Economic Effect
In order to quantify the aggregate effects under a carbon allowance trading program, it is necessary to define key elements of the program. Those include the number of allowances issued, the allowance price, and the allocation/revenuerecycling strategy. Effects would differ depending on whether trading of allowances was domestic only or if international trading was possible.
Domestic Trading Scenario
The level of U.S. carbon emissions under a domestic trading program would be limited to the number of allowances issued by the U.S. government. The allowance price would reflect the marginal cost of adjusting to that carbon limit. Several studies have estimated how much carbon emissions would decrease as the price of emitting carbon increases. We use a demand elasticity estimate of -.57, which was found by geometrically averaging the relevant results of nine models that used empirical data to estimate the responsiveness of carbon emissions to carbon prices. 10 Based on that estimate, a 15 percent emission limit would corre- Bovenberg and Goulder (June, 1999) estimate that equity values in the coal industry would rise by 1,000 percent if the government gave allowances away to fossil fuel producers. We assume that allowance allocations would be based on historic production levels (as was the case for SO 2 allowances). Thus, the allocation would represent a windfall gain to producers and would not affect current production decisions. 9 Forty-five percent was chosen because the average marginal corporate tax rate is 30 percent and it was assumed that an additional 10 percent of the total amount of profits was captured through dividend and capital gains taxes paid by households. Finally, we assumed that state and local governments captured an additional 5 percent of the allowance rent. For a discussion of the incentive effects that the tax treatment of allowances might have see Fisher, Kerr, and Toman (1998) and Auten and Brasheres(1999) . 10 The models that we included are: Second Generation Model (Batelle Laboratory and the Administration);
Multi-Sector, Multi-Regional Trade Model; National Energy Modeling System (Charles Rivers Associates);
spond to an allowance price of $100, with each allowance permitting the release of one metric ton of carbon emissions.
Most existing analyses of carbon trading programs consider the impact of programs that are implemented in the 2008 to 2012 time period (many focus on the year 2010). Pre-policy carbon emissions are expected to be 1.8 billion in 2010, whereas they were 1.5 billion in 1998.
11 As described below, we use 1998 data on consumer expenditures to examine the distributional effects of a carbon trading policy. Thus, we use 1998 emission levels (see Table 1 ).
Further, we separate government carbon consumption from private carbon consumption.
12 Government costs would increase as the carbon constraint increases Calculated based on the permit price, the change in carbon emissions, a $307 pre-policy price of carbon and a demand-elasticity estimate of -57.
Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects of Greenhouse Gas Reduction Policies (Electric Power Research Institute and Stanford University); Jorgenson-Wilcoxen-Slesnick model; and Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis Model (MIT); and the models by Data Resources Incorporated; Oxford; and WEFA. These models use different assumptions about the cost and adoption rate of different technologies that would reduce carbon emissions. The estimates from those nine models range from a high of -1.30 to a low of -0.41, although six of the estimates lie between -0.50 and -0.41. 11 Estimated based on January 1998 through October 1998 fossil fuel consumption data (Energy Information Administration, January 1999) and carbon emission intensity factors for each fossil fuel. 12 That estimate includes government's direct and indirect demand for carbon. The direct demand was obtained by examining the government's direct demand for coal, oil, gas, and electricity. Government's indirect demand for carbon was based on government's share of total spending on goods and services (after adjusting for government payroll costs and capital depreciation).
the price of carbon-intensive goods that the government purchases. Unlike private sector cost increases, it is unlikely that government cost increases would be passed onto households in proportion to their consumption of carbon-intensive goods. We assume that the government would pay for its increased cost through the additional revenue that it would collect as a result of the policy (through profits tax collections or through auction revenue). That means that increased government costs would reduce the revenue available for recycling. The cost of allowance purchases and the deadweight loss in the carbon market could fall on both consumers and producers. The longer the time period over which factors can adjust, the more the cost of the policy is borne by consumers. In the long run, capital and labor would leave carbon producing industries until returns to factors in those industries reflected returns throughout the rest of the economy. In this analysis we take a long run perspective and assume that the entire cost would be passed forward (as depicted in Figure 1 ).
The magnitude of the deadweight loss in the factor markets (the tax-interaction effect) depends on the allowance allocation/revenue-recycling strategy that the government chooses. We use three different estimates of that deadweight loss (see Table 1 ). In the first case, the government's allowance allocation/revenue-recycling strategy does not offset any of the initial tax interaction effect. This would be the case if the government used its share of the allowance revenue to provide lumpsum payments to households (it applies both to the auction/lump-sum rebate case and to the free-distribution/lump-sum rebate case). In the second case, the government gives the allowances away, so it captures only a share of their value. The government uses that share-net of policy-induced increases in government costs and offsetting declines in tax collection-to decrease corporate taxes or payroll taxes. In this case, the government recycles 16 percent of the allowance value. 13 In the third case, the government auctions off the allowances and uses that value (net of the policy-induced changes in government costs and revenue detailed in footnote 12) to provide a decrease in either corporate or payroll taxes. In this case the government recycles 70 percent of the allowance value. As indicated in Table 1 , the magnitude of the deadweight loss in the factor markets varies significantly with government allocation/revenue recycling decisions and can be substantial-nearly triple the size of the deadweight loss in the carbon market.
Our estimate of the policy-induced increase in the deadweight loss in the factor markets in these three cases is based on Parry et. al. (1999) . For various percentage reductions in carbon emissions, Parry et. al. indicate the ratio of the average cost of emission reductions when pre-existing taxes are accounted for to the case where no pre-existing taxes exist (the implicit assumption in a partial equilibrium analysis of the carbon market). They provide this ratio for two different cases-recycling 100 percent of the allowance value (their carbon tax case) and recycling 40 percent of the allowance value (their carbon quota case). For a given percentage decline in emissions, the magnitude of the tax-inter- 13 The government captures 45 percent of the allowance value through profits tax collections ($57.6 billion). This is partially offset, however, by higher government costs due to government consumption of allowances ($16.6 billion), the government's share of the deadweight loss in the carbon market ($1.4 billion), and higher transfer income payments made to hold real transfer payments constant as the price level rises ($8.9 billion). It is further offset by lower government revenues due to the decline in GDP associated with the deadweight loss in the carbon market ($2 billion) and a decline in individual income tax collections due to automatic indexing ($9.05 billion). The first two effects are indicated in Table 1 , the last three effects are discussed in Section IV.
action effect is fixed (determined by the price increase that the emissions cut brings about) but the offsetting revenue recycling effect varies depending on the amount of revenue that the government uses to decrease pre-existing taxes. The relationship between the magnitude of the offsetting revenue recycling effect and the percentage recycled is linear; therefore, the two cases used in Parry et. al. can be used to derive estimates of the deadweight loss in the factor markets for the specific revenue recycling percentages used in this analysis.
14 The revenue recycling effects estimated by Parry et. al. are the best available, but are based on an economy with labor as the only factor of production. We implicitly assume that the elasticities of capital supply and the marginal excess burden of capital taxes are similar to those of labor. Because of this, our estimates of the deadweight loss in the factor markets should be viewed as approximations. Nonetheless, their inclusion provides important insights into the manner in which factor market effects impact the distributional effects of carbon trading policies.
International Trading Scenario
Unlike with domestic trading, the level of U.S. emissions under an international trading program would not be determined by the number of allowances that the U.S. government issues. U.S. emissions could exceed the number of allowances issued as U.S. firms purchase allowances from foreign firms or governments. If successfully implemented, international trading would significantly lower the price of allowances because of the large supply of potential low cost emission reductions in some countries-such as Russia. There is considerable uncertainty about the viability of an international trading market for carbon allowances and the price at which foreign allowances would be available. For this paper, we arbitrarily assume that foreign allowances would be available for an allowance price of $60.
If U.S. firms could purchase foreign allowances for $60, the decrease in carbon emissions would be determined by that price. Thus, based on the demand elasticity estimate described above, U.S. emissions would fall 10 percent from the baseline level to 1.35 billion. Although the number of allowances purchased by U.S. firms would be higher with international trading (one for each of the 1.35 billion metric tons of carbon emissions), the price of an allowance would be sufficiently lower, so that total expenditures on allowances would fall from $128 billion under domestic trading to $81 billion under international trading. The deadweight losses in both the carbon and factor markets would also fall under the international trading scenario due to the lower allowance price. Under international trading, the level of U.S. emissions would exceed the amount of allowances issued by the U.S. government. Thus, total expenditures on allowances (which includes allowances purchased from foreign entities) would exceed the value of allowances issued to U.S. firms. That has important implications for the distribution of the cost of a trading program across U.S. households (discussed in the fifth section).
14 We are grateful to Ian Parry for providing us with this insight and to Roberton Williams, III for providing us with the underlying data to enable us to make these calculations. We made one adjustment to their tax interaction effect estimate. They assumed that the existing tax on labor would be raised to cover policy induced increases in government costs; therefore, their tax interaction effect estimate includes the efficiency cost of this increase in the labor tax rate. We assume, however, that the government would cover additional costs by using some of its share of the allowance value. We, therefore, deduct the efficiency cost associated with raising pre-existing taxes to cover higher government costs (z"Fs G in equation 2.13 of Parry et. al.) from our estimate of the tax interaction effect.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY USED TO DETERMINE HOUSEHOLD LEVEL EFFECTS
We translate policy effects into changes in households' well-being by applying the aggregate effects listed in Table 1 to detailed data on industries and households. We calculate effects on annual real incomes of U.S. households differentiated by annual income levels.
Households' share of the allowance costs (see Table 1 ) are based on their consumption patterns because those costs are passed onto households in the form of higher commodity prices-with price increases reflecting each commodity's carbon content. Metcalf (1999) used the Bureau of Economic Analysis' I-O Accounts of the U.S. economy to determine the carbon content of commodities and the relative price increases that a carbon charge would bring about. We adjust Metcalf's results to reflect the allowance price (i.e., carbon charge) used in our analysis (see Table 2 ).
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Next, we apply the relative price increases for the different consumer goods to a household-level data set that merges information on consumption, income, and taxes from several sources. The sample of households used in this study reflects the families and demographic mix found on the Current Population Survey (CPS), March 1995 for calendar year 1994. More detailed information on income and taxes from tax-return data in the Statistics of Income (SOI), also from 1994, are merged with the CPS. 16 The 1994 data are scaled up to reflect forecasted aggregates for 1998, so that our analysis simulates the effects of allowance policy on a 1998 economy. There are 57,247 households in our sample. These sample households are weighted by demographic characteristics to represent the entire set of U.S. households.
The impact of consumer price increases (due to allowance costs being passed forward) on households is determined based on data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CEX), merged with the household sample defined by the CPS. The CEX is missing information about consumption of the highest-income households. We, therefore, rely on an econometrically estimated measure of consumption for those households that was developed by the Congressional Budget Office.
We distribute the deadweight loss from the carbon market across households using the same method as we allocate allowance costs-that is, based on their pre-policy consumption of carbon. Not having quintile-specific estimates of policy-induced changes in carbon consumption is a limitation of our analysisbut not, we feel, a serious one. The assumption that high carbon-consuming households would bear costs either in the form of higher prices (continuing their 15 Our prices can be derived from Metcalf's results because his results reveal the relative change in prices that result from carbon charges based on the relative carbon content of goods-determined from BEA's inputoutput tables. Our estimate of U.S. expenditures on allowances (as presented in Table 1 ) is to equivalent to Metcalf's carbon tax revenue estimate (simply the post-policy amount of carbon multiplied by the price of carbon). We, therefore, scale Metcalf's relative prices up to account for the fact that our allowance expenditures estimate is greater than his tax revenue estimate. We needed to make an additional adjustment to account for the fact that our measure of consumption (derived from the consumer expenditure survey) falls short of consumption as measured in the National Income and Products Accounts so that our quantity of carbon emissions is lower than the true quantity. (The measure of consumption in this data set does not include, for example, health expenditures out of medicare/medicaid cash payments and the imputed rental value of housing). We effectively impute the missing consumption to households as proportional to included consumption by scaling up prices to generate the same amount of revenue as would be raised if the full quantity of carbon in the economy were charged the given allowance price. 16 In contrast to the set of households from the Consumer Expenditure Survey (which defined the sample used by Metcalf), our sample contains more information on higher-income households.
carbon consumption) or through avoidance costs (decreasing their carbon consumption) seems reasonable. The consumption-to-income patterns that result from the CEX (expenditure) data are shown in Table 3 . Those patterns play an important role in determining how the cost of the policy-induced price increases are distributed across households in different quintiles. The CEX data indicate that lower-income households consume much larger fractions of their annual income than do their higher-income counterparts. Recent research, however, indicates that the consumption-toincome ratios implied by the CEX data are more skewed than can be explained by the difference between annual and permanent measures of income (Sabelhaus and Groen, 2000) . The extremely high consumption-to-income ratios for low-income households (in excess of 200 percent) are probably due to unreported income and private transfers (such as gifts from family members).
An alternative to measuring consumption directly from consumer expenditure survey data is to measure it indirectly from wealth data that can be used to suggest saving rates, and in turn, consumption. We use such an approach, developed by Sabelhaus (1993) , to derive an alternative estimate of consumption-to-income. 17 While the wealth data still indicate that total consumption as a percentage of income decreases with income level, the inverse progression with income is not nearly as steep. Because the degree of skewness in total consumption-to-income differs substantially between the two approaches, and the consumptionto-income ratio is a key factor in determining our results, we present a range of results which correspond to the two different methods.
Table 3 also illustrates that carbon-intensive consumption-defined here as expenditures on electricity, natural gas, fuel oil and coal, and gasoline and oilmakes up larger fractions of the total expenditures of lower-income households. 18 We derive the quintile-specific mix of consumption from the CEX data. That same mix is applied to the consumption levels implied by the wealth data.
Detailed consumption data can be used to distribute only part of the policy effects. The deadweight loss in the factor markets is distributed across households based on their factor incomes. Further, the rent associated with the allowances must be distributed across households. People would benefit from the allowance rent differently, depending on their income composition (if allowances are given away) and the taxes they pay (when revenue is recycled by reducing taxes). We use the detailed tax-return data in the SOI to characterize the distributional effects associated with giving allowances away and recycling the revenue through decreases in corporate taxes, payroll taxes, or lump-sum rebates. Corporate tax liabilities are assigned to households based on their personal capital income.
19 Employer and employee shares of payroll (social security plus Carbon-intensive consumption includes expenditures on electricity, natural gas, fuel oil and coal, and gasoline and oil. 17 The wealth-based savings rates in Sabelhaus were based on changes in the net worth of households as reported in the CEX. 18 Note that the distributional effects presented in the fifth section account for the carbon content of all goodsthis subset of goods is presented to demonstrate that the most carbon-intensive goods make up disproportionate shares of lower-income households' consumption. 19 The corporate tax has an initial incidence on corporate capital, but when capital used by corporations flows into the economy, part-or all-of the burden could be shifted onto capital in general, or onto labor. Based on an extensive review of the literature on corporate tax incidence (see U.S. Congressional Budget Office, March 1996) we assign corporate tax liabilities to households based on their personal capital income. The tax return data in the SOI facilitates a translation of corporate taxes into household effects because it has detailed information about the different pieces of income that are related to the ultimate incidence of the various business-level taxes. medicare) taxes are assigned proportional to observed labor income, with the social security portion applied only up to the maximum taxable earnings in 1998. We use household dividend and capital gains income as a proxy for the distribution of stock ownership. Note that the carbon policy causes a 2.8 percent increase in the general price level. That rise in the price level would result in automatic increases in income for households that receive transfer income that is indexed to the price level. We account for this by indexing Supplemental Security Income, Social Security benefits, and federal pensions. We assume that the government would pay for that increase in transfer payments (which totals $8.9 billion) out of the share of allowance rent that it would receive as a result of the allowance policy. That is, the increase in transfer payments is deducted from the revenue that is available for recycling.
Policy-induced price increases would also lead to lower collections of individual income taxes due to automatic indexing of parts of the individual income tax, including the exemptions and tax brackets. Each 1 percent increase in the price level was assumed to result in a 0.5 percent decrease in individual income tax payments, further reducing the revenue that the government is able to recycle by $9.05 billion. We distribute those lower tax payments across households based on results from the Congressional Budget Office's Personal Income Tax Model. 20 Those lower payments disproportionately benefit higher-income households. Finally, we account for an estimated $2 billion loss in tax revenue associated with the decline in GDP due to the deadweight loss in the carbon market.
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RESULTS
We measure policy effects by changes in real annual household income.
22 Households are sorted into quintiles and results indicate the average effect for each quintile. Table 4 shows the increase in average household costs due to the policy's deadweight loss in the carbon market and the pass through of allowance costs. The magnitude and distribution of those costs are independent of the allowance allocation/ revenue-recycling strategy. The degree of regressivity resulting from those costs, however, varies significantly depending on whether the pattern of consumptionto-income is based on expenditure data or wealth data. The cost impacts that are implied by the expenditure data are highly regressive. In contrast, the incidence is only slightly regressive when consumption-to-income ratios are based on wealth data. The cost borne by the average household falls from 2.8 percent of annual income for the lowest income quintile to 2.3 percent for the highest quintile. The average cost as a share of income for the lower quintiles is reduced by the indexing of transfer payments (described above). Those payments make up a relatively large share of income for households in the lowest quintiles. Table 5 shows the distribution of deadweight loss in the factor markets. As indicated above, the magnitude of this cost 20 The affect of the price increases on income tax payments and the distribution of that decline in revenue across income quintiles was based on the U.S. Congressional Budget Office's Personal Income Tax Model. We are grateful to David Weiner of the CBO for providing us with the relevant model output. 21 Calculation based on U.S. Congressional Budget Office (January 2000). The estimate of deadweight loss in the factor markets includes the efficiency cost created by the an increase in existing tax rates to make up for tax revenue losses as labor and capital supplies are reduced; therefore, we do not include reduced revenue due to lower factor market supplies when determining the revenue that is available for recycling. 22 The measure of income used excludes in-kind transfers and accrued but yet unrealized income. varies according to the allowance allocation/revenue-recycling scenario. Households' shares of this cost are independent of their consumption decisions; rather, they are borne by households in proportion to their labor and capital income. Unlike the carbon market costs presented in Table 4 , these costs are progressive. Tables 6 and 7 show the combined effects of the cost impacts (in Tables 4 and  5 ), the distribution of the allowance rent, and the distribution of the lower personal income tax payments. Estimates of these combined effects vary depending on whether consumption-to-income ratios are based on expenditure data (Table 6) or wealth data (Table 7) . Except for the auction/lump-sum rebate strategy, all of the allocation/revenue-recycling strategies are regressive. The policy effects appear more regressive-or in the case of the auction/lump-sum rebate, less progres- The average cost for all households reported here includes the government's share of allowance and substitution costs. The distribution of government costs across households will depend on the government's allowance allocation/revenue recycle strategy. Government costs are not included in the quintile specific costs reported. b As described in Section III, allowance costs are not costs to the economy as a whole. Under domestic trading, they are fully offset by the allowance rent that households receive. Allowance costs play an important role in the distributional effects of the policy, however, because each household's share of the allowance costs is likely to be different from its share of the allowance rent. These changes are equivalent to percentage decreases in after-tax incomes. sive-when price effects are allocated across households based on the highly skewed consumption-to-income ratios resulting from expenditure data. Table 8 summarizes some important results. The policies are ranked from those that increase income for households in the lowest income quintile to those that cause the largest loss for that quintile. The rank order is the same, regardless of whether consumption-to-income ratios are based on expenditure data or wealth data.
Domestic Trading Results
The share of the policy cost that is borne by households in the lowest quintile is largest when the government gives allowances away and uses the revenue that it receives (from the taxes collected on the increased profits that the allowances generate) to decrease corporate taxes. We estimate that those households would experience a 6.2 percent decline in income based on expenditure data and a 1.2 percent decline based on wealth data. Households in the highest income quintile experience an increase in income under this allocation/revenue-recycling strategy. That occurs because the gains that they receive from the share of allowance rent that they receive directly (due to their stock holdings) and indirectly (due to the decrease in the corporate tax when revenue is recycled) is greater than their in- crease in cost due to the policy-induced price increases and associated deadweight losses in the carbon market and factor markets.
In contrast, average household income in the lowest quintile would increase if the government were to auction the allowances off and use the revenue to issue lump-sum rebates. That increase is estimated to be 3.5 percent based on expenditure data and 7.3 percent based on wealth data. Average real household income increases for the lowest quintile because the magnitude of the lump-sum rebate that they receive is greater than the increased costs that they incur as a result of the policy-induced price increases (Table 4) . Although the deadweight loss in the factor markets is greatest under this scenario (over six times as large as it would be if the government used the auction revenue to decrease corporate taxes), that loss falls disproportionately on higher-income households.
The income gains to the highest quintile are greater under the auction/decrease corporate tax strategy than under the freedistribution/decrease corporate tax strategy because the auction generates more revenue to reduce the distortionary cost of the corporate tax (and thus, the deadweight loss in the factor markets is lower), and that deadweight loss falls disproportionately on higher-income households. 23 Further, higher-income households benefit more when the government decreases corporate taxes than when it decreases payroll taxes. Payroll taxes are considerably less progressive than corporate taxes. Because of the ceiling on taxable social security wages, payroll tax burdens are progressive in incidence only through the fourth quintile.
A difference that is not apparent from our analysis is that the rent that flows to households through increases in stock values is concentrated in the relatively few households that own stock in the companies that receive allowances. In contrast, the gains associated with decreasing corporate or payroll taxes would be much more widely distributed across households within each quintile.
The Effects of International Trading
How would international trading affect the domestic scenario results presented above? All of the international trading results that we report are based on consumption-income ratios that are derived from the CEX expenditure data. 24 Under domestic trading, the net effect (on average across all households) of passing allowance costs forward on to households and distributing the allowance rent back to households would be zero. That result is indicated by the zero in the column labeled "excess allowance costs" in Table 6 . Under international trading, U.S. allowance expenditures would exceed the value of U.S. issued allowances by an amount of $40 per household (see Table 9 ). Excess allowance expenditures are paid to foreign firms.
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Excess allowance costs, taken in isolation, would make U.S. households (on average) worse off under international trading vis-a-vis domestic trading. That is only one part of the story, however. In- 23 This offsets the fact that stocks are more concentrated in higher-income households than capital generally and stockholders would exclusively benefit from the free-distribution, while capital owners generally would benefit from a decrease in the corporate tax. 24 Results based on wealth data are available from the authors but demonstrate the same pattern as results based on CEX expenditure data. 25 The U.S. would need to export more of other goods to finance the import of allowances; this would crowd out domestic consumption. The magnitude of this crowding out, in turn, would depend on the extent to which export demand rose due to a decline in the value of the dollar or due to the income effect generated by the rise in foreign income due to allowance revenue. That crowding out effect is not accounted for in this paper.
ternational trading would also lower the deadweight losses in the carbon and factor markets. For each policy scenario, total costs per household (i.e., excess allowance costs plus deadweight losses) are lower under international trading than under domestic trading. For example, under the free-distribution/decrease corporate tax strategy, total costs average $220 per household, as opposed to $331 under domestic trading. In aggregate, therefore, international trading makes U.S. households better off because it lowers the total policy costs for the nation as a whole. That result holds regardless of the assumptions that are made about the price of foreign allowances or the speed at which carbon emissions decrease as allowance prices increase (the elasticity of demand estimate). The magnitude of the gain, however, will vary depending on those assumptions. Households that bear a disproportionate share of the costs of a carbon trading program (relative to their share of the allowance rent) are made better off under international trading compared with domestic trading. That can be seen in Table  10 , which compares the relative gain or loss that households incur when a foreign supply of allowances is available (Table  9) versus domestic trading only (Table 6 ). Households that experience losses under domestic trading (lower-income households for all allocations schemes except the auction/lump-sum rebate) are made better off by international trading. In contrast, households that received a disproportionate share of the rent under domestic trading (higher-income households for all allocations except the auction/lumpsum rebate) are made worse off by international trading.
ANNUAL VERSUS LIFETIME EFFECTS
The use of detailed household-level data necessitates focusing on annual measures of incomes and burdens. This annual perspective, however, might not provide an accurate view of lifetime incomes and burdens, both because the sorting of people by annual income might not coincide well with a sorting based on lifetime income, and because the patterns of long-run expenditures and tax burdens may differ from the patterns of annual measures. At the same time, annual incidence measures are important. Annual income can be a more useful measure of the household's current ability to bear the policy's cost than is lifetime income. Capital markets are not perfect, so a household's current ability to spend is probably more closely related to annual income than to lifetime income. The deviation from the pure life cycle model (which assumes current consumption is a function of lifetime income but not annual income) is especially likely for borrowers. Even among those who would desire to draw down assets, constraints on withdrawing from pensions (in particular, age requirements) may prevent current consumption from being perfectly invariant with respect to changes in annual income. Ideally, distributional analyses should try to evaluate both annual incidence and longer-run, or lifetime, incidence (Rogers, 1999) . It is not possible to actually observe lifetime income for individual households, so any analysis of longer-run incidence using detailed microdata must impute lifetime income based on annual income, annual consumption, and/or other demographic characteristics. Because of the possible inaccuracies associated with such an imputation, especially when done on a household-by-household basis, some analysts take an alternative approach of using annual income measures but throwing out observations on the young and the old. This strategy of looking at annual incomes of middle-aged individuals is presumed to better reflect longer-run incidence both by: (i) avoiding the end points of the life cycle when annual income tends to be lower than consumption, and (ii) picking a point in the life cycle when the ranking of people by annual income would be most likely to be similar to the ranking by permanent income. CEX data indicate that consumption-to-income ratios would still decline with increases in income for middle-aged households, but only by a slightly lesser amount than for the population as a whole. Thus, the effects associated with the policy-induced price increases continue to be regressive, but slightly less so, when the analysis is confined to middle-aged cohorts.
LIMITATIONS
Our analysis does not account for the fact that a carbon charge could affect the relative returns to labor and capital, depending on the capital-labor ratio in carbon-intensive industries relative to other industries. As the production of carbonintensive industries declines, the production of other industries using less carbon will increase, and that change in the mix of outputs implies changes in the relative demands for capital and labor. Declines in the relative return to capital would tend to dampen the price effects observed in this paper because capital income is more concentrated in higher-income households than labor income.
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A further limitation is that our analysis does not reveal within-quintile variations in effects. Of particular importance may be the lack of regional differences (our analysis is based on average national effects). For example, the estimate of how much the cost of electricity will increase reflects the average carbon intensity of electricity production throughout the U.S. The actual cost of the policy will vary significantly across regions based on their current use of carbon based fuels.
Finally, our paper is a static analysis. It does not account for the effects that the policy might have on capital accumulation or on invention and diffusion of technologies that would reduce the use of carbon.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper demonstrates that the ultimate incidence of the carbon trading policy is, in large part, a function of policy design. While the distribution of allowance costs and the carbon market deadweight loss across households is determined by households' purchasing 26 As pointed out in the third section, our analysis is also limited due to the fact that the magnitude of our taxinteraction and revenue recycling effects are based on the assumption that capital and labor supplies have similar elasticities and capital and labor taxes impose similar marginal excess burdens. Future research could relax these assumptions.
patterns, that is only part of the story. The government determines the magnitude of the deadweight loss in factor markets and the ultimate incidence of the policy by its decision about how to allocate the allowances and how to recycle the share of allowance rent that it collects as a result of the policy. Understanding both the efficiency and distributional implications of those allocation/revenue-recycling decisions is important because the magnitude of both effects can be very large. At the same time, predicting the incidence of a carbon trading program is complicated by problems in obtaining accurate data on consumption and income. This paper has taken particular care to highlight those problems and present alternative results based on different estimation methods. Our analysis accounts for the fact that the government would receive a share of the allowance rent regardless of whether it gave the allowances away or auctioned them off. That is because the free-distribution strategy would lead to higher profits for the firms that receive the allowances, and thus, to higher tax receipts. Further, our analysis carefully accounts for policy-induced government cost increases and revenue declines. Those effects significantly reduce the amount of revenue that the government is able to recycle under each scenario.
The government could use the additional revenue that it obtains as a result of the policy to achieve at least two possible goals. It could make the policy more equitable by recycling the revenue in a way that offsets the regressivity of the policyinduced price changes. Alternatively, it could recycle the revenue by decreasing pre-existing distortionary taxes and, hence, seek efficiency gains. As demonstrated here, the government's ability to achieve either of these goals is greater when it auctions off allowances than when it gives them away. Further, these two goals may conflict. If the government sought to offset the regressivity of the policy-induced price increases by providing lump-sum rebates, lower-income households would be better off, but the cost to the economy would be greater than if the government used the revenue to decrease pre-existing taxes. We have not examined combinations of allocation/ revenue-recycling strategies, but such combinations may allow the government to meet competing objectives. For example, Bovenberg and Goulder (1999) examined what fraction of allowances would need to be given away to compensate firms in the fossil fuel sector for transitional costs.
Finally, we examine the distributional implications of international trading. While international trading would lower the aggregate cost that the policy imposed on U.S. households, that gain would not be shared equally by all households. Households that received a disproportionate share of the allowance rent under a given allocation/revenue-recycling strategy would be made worse off by international trading. That is because the total value associated with U.S. issued allowances would fall as the foreign supply of allowances lowers allowance prices. Households that would experience a loss in real income under domestic trading, however, would be made better off by international trading. Under all but one of the six allocation/recycling strategies considered in this paper, lower-income households are made better off by international trading while households in the highest quintile are made worse off.
